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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
bodies to lay excess levies. Less than thirty years ago the voters
constitutionally limited tax levies. Their disapproval of a liberalizing
amendment in 1956 indicated a reluctance to vest additional tax
levying powers in governmental units. In the instant case the court
squarely points out that the voice of the people must be expressed
through constitutional language before the legislature may effect
such tax levy increases.
Frederick Luther Davis, Jr.
Damages-Torts-Punitive Damages Denied Against
Joint Tort-Feasors
P brought an action for libel against a newspaper publishing
company and two individual defendants. During the course of the
trial P offered evidence which shed light on the financial worth of
the individual defendants, but P did not show the worth of the pub-
lishing company. Two jury verdicts were returned for P, one of
$50,000 compensatory damages, and one of $50,000 punitive dam-
ages. Held, although in such a case P would ordinarily be able to
recover punitive damages, when more than one party is made de-
fendant, P waives his right to punitive damages. Dunaway v. Troutt,
339 S.W.2d 613 (Ark. 1960).
The principal case adheres to what is called a majority rule in
deciding this case. This majority is said to hold that since a judg-
ment for punitive damages against more than one party might ac-
tually result in greater punishment for one joint tort-feasor than
another who is equally liable, plaintiff waives his right to punitive
damages when he sues more than one party. The leading case adher-
ing to this view apparently is Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden,
172 U.S. 534 (1898), which held in effect that there was no justice
in allowing a recovery of punitive damages based on evidence of the
ability to pay of only one of a number of defendants. However, the
principal case failed to point out the Court's own reservations in
the Lansden case when it was pointed out that the rule did not pre-
vent the recovery of punitive damages in all cases involving joint
defendants. The Court further said: "What the true rule is in such
a case is not . . . certain." 172 U.S. 534, 553.
There are courts which unhesitatingly hold in accordance with
the views expressed in the principal case, an example being the
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Supreme Court of Missouri, which said in Brown v. Payne, 264
S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1954), that it was prejudicial error to allow the
recovery of punitive damages against joint tort-feasors.
The principal case cited, among others, McAlister v. Kimberly-
Clark Co., 169 Wis. 473, 173 N.W. 216 (1919), as authority for
its position. However, the Wisconsin case said that where plaintiff
had elected to sue more than one person, any judgment entered
would be a judgment against all. Therefore, any evidence as to the
financial status of one would effect the liability of all. Hence, the
Wisconsin court felt that admission of such evidence would be pre-
judicial error. The Wisconsin court did not refuse the assessment
of punitive damages against joint tort-feasors, but merely disallowed
evidence of their wealth. This appears to be the situation in other
cases cited by the Arkansas court in support of its holding. See
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bryant, 105 Va. 403, 54 S. E. 320 (1906), and
Smith v. Wunderlich, 70 Ill. 426 (1873).
Of those states which have considered the precise question in
the principal case, there are a number which hold that it is quite
proper to return a verdict for punitive damages against joint de-
fendants, and in so doing the jury could consider the ability of dif-
ferent ones to pay, and that what was competent evidence as to
one tort-feasor would be competent as to all. Tipps Tool Co. v.
Hatfield, 218 Miss. 670, 67 So.2d 609 (1953); Edquest v. Tripp
& Dragstedt Co., 93 Mont. 446, 19 P.2d 637 (1933); Johnson v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443 (1927). In
the last mentioned case, the court was very critical of the Lansden
case, supra, which originally arose in South Carolina. The court
in the Johnson case, supra, felt that the latter case created an un-
certainty and would lead the jurors to consider defendants' appar-
ent worth and allow a recovery of punitive damages under the guise
of more extensive compensatory damages. In order to reach a
fairer result, the Johnson case allowed an apportionment of punitive
damages among the several defendants, a procedure which has been
followed in some states. Browant v. Scott Lumber Co., 125 Cal.
App. 2d 68, 269 P.2d 891 (1954); Edquest v. Tripp & Dragstedt
Co., 93 Mont. 446, 19 P.2d 637 (1933); Phelan v. Beswick, 213
Ore. 612, 326 P.2d 1034 (1958).
It is apparent that West Virginia and other jurisdictions have
allowed punitive damages against joint tort-feasors simply because
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the issue was not raised. In Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 94
S.E. 968 (1918), the West Virginia court said, in a case involving
joint defendants, that it was proper to consider the social and
pecuniary standing of the parties. Accord, Pendleton v. Norfolk
& Western Ry. Co., 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918). See also
Binder v. G.M.A.C., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894 (1943).
In the decision in the principal case, the court acknowledged
that a malicious or wanton tort-feasor might go unpunished, but on
the other hand the court felt that any other result would bring about
an unjust punishment of one joint tort-feasor. The court concluded,
in accordance with the well recognized principle of justice, that it
is better for several guilty persons to go unpunished than to have
one innocent person punished. But, should a wanton tort-feasor be
under the classification of 'innocent person'? The principal case, in
failing to differentiate between cases refusing evidence of wealth
and those refusing recovery of punitive damages, may also not
be in accord with the majority, as it purports to be. The better
result probably is that reached in those states allowing an appor-
tionment of punitive damages among joint tort-feasors. Such a
result seems to solve the conflict between a meting out of punish-
ishment on one hand and an undue punishment on the other.
Lee O'Hanlon Hill
Evidence-Admissibility of Tape Recordings Where Portions
Are Inaudible
Appeal from a conviction on two counts of extortion. Appellant
assigns as error the introduction into evidence of a recording, por-
tions of which were inaudible. Held, where the inaudible portions
cannot be deemed so substantial as to render the whole untrust-
worthy, the admission into evidence of a tape recording, portions
of which were unintelligible, is not prejudicial error. Cape v. United
States, 283 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1960).
The instant case is the latest in a field of evidence law which
was virtually unknown in the not too distant past. Technical dif-
ficulties aside, the problem of partially inaudible recordings has been
raised in a number of recent cases with the question of admissibility
usually depending upon the amount of the indistinct portion and
the trial court's discretion. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1038 (1958). Cape
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